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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When comparing, say, the welfare derived from income by a family that is comprised of two adults and
three children to that of a single adult, it is necessary to take into consideration the relative needs of the
respective households. The most common means by which applied studies in economics currently relate
the needs of heterogeneous income units is through the use of equivalence scales. Despite a considerable
research eﬀort, however, almost every aspect of equivalence scale speciﬁcation remains controversial.
What characteristics should equivalence scales take into account? Should the scales apply an additive
or multiplicative adjustment to income? Is the assumption of base independence valid?1 How should
a reference unit be selected? Is it reasonable to assume that there is no inequality within an income
unit? What criteria are most sensible for selecting a functional form? And, arguably most important,
do the cardinal relations implied by equivalence scales permit income units to be compared in terms
of underlying welfare? All of these questions remain largely unresolved.
This paper is concerned with estimating the relativities that are implicit in tax and beneﬁts pol-
icy. Using observed tax and beneﬁts payments to estimate equivalence scales may mitigate some of
the criticisms to which alternative scale speciﬁcation criteria have been subject. For example, most
econometric estimates of equivalence scales used for distributional analysis are based on consumer
demand behaviour. Pollak and Wales (1979, p. 216) have notably criticised this methodology on the
basis that “the equivalence scales required for welfare comparisons are logically distinct from those
which arise in demand analysis”.2 The central diﬃculty is that demand analysis fails to provide a
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1Base independence (Lewbel, 1989, and Blundell and Lewbel, 1991) requires the equivalence scale to be unaﬀected
by the level of utility (or income). This requirement is referred to as ‘equivalence scale exactness’ by Blackorby and
Donaldson (1993).
2Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, chapters 7, 8 and 9) provide a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical underpin-
nings of the demand based approach for estimating equivalence scales. Muellbauer (1975) pointed out the diﬃculties of
making welfare comparisons, given taste diﬀerences of the type used in equivalence scale models.
1basis for making cardinal comparisons of welfare between households, and so equivalence scales that
are estimated from expenditure data necessarily depend upon exogenously imposed value judgements.
In contrast, part of the intuitive appeal of equivalence scales based on a country’s transfer system
is the perception that such relativities embody a social consensus; that the tax and beneﬁts system,
being an observable instrument of government, can be used to infer the value judgements made by
government when acting in its role as administrative agent for society.3
Comparison of the relativities that underlie taxation with equivalence scales based on the costs
borne by heterogeneous income units could also provide a useful means for evaluating the adequacy
of associated provisions made by transfer systems. Alternatively, the equivalence scales implicit in
transfer systems could be used to compare the provisions made through time and/or between countries.
Such equivalence scales could also play a role in the tax design process itself. In view of the fact that
the redistributive systems of many countries are comprised of numerous diﬀerent tax and beneﬁt
schemes, it is diﬃcult to ensure that the overall system does in fact achieve the desired redistribution.
Information about implicit scales — which may on reﬂection be found to diﬀer from the values held by
policy makers — can be useful in suggesting that certain features of the tax system need adjusting.
The prevailing uncertainty regarding how an equivalence scale should be speciﬁed has particular
relevance when considering the redistributive eﬀects of taxation. This is because measures of pro-
gressivity and horizontal inequity calculated from equivalised income are often observed to depend
upon the equivalence scale assumed. Hence, distributional analyses of equivalent income are typically
subject to the criticism that horizontal inequity is ‘imposed from the outside’.4 The analysis presented
in this paper essentially reverses the prevailing methodology by assuming that horizontal equity is, on
average, satisﬁed by a transfer system. This assumption enables the relativities implicit in transfer
policy to be inferred from observed tax and beneﬁts payments.
The reversal of methodology suggested here is analogous to the analysis presented in a recent paper
by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2002), which considers the social preferences that are consistent with
observed marginal tax rates. The traditional approach adopted to evaluate a transfer system using
optimal tax theory involves assuming a ‘reasonable’ social welfare function, and then comparing the
implied ‘optimal tax schedule’ with the schedule that is observed in practice.5 In contrast, Bourguignon
3See, for example, Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980, pp. 404-405), and Foley (1967). This argument in favour of equivalence
scales based on tax and beneﬁts systems has been questioned by Coulter et al. (1992, p. 100) who, referring to the
social security reforms that were made in the UK in April 1988, state that the “controversy that accompanied the social
security changes gives little support to the idea that the reforms represented a social consensus opinion.” Alternatively,
Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980, p. 9) warn that “Tax and expenditure policy may be designed more with a view to electoral
success, or the goals of an established bureaucracy, than to social welfare maximisation.”
4See referee comments cited by Lambert (2003, footnote 2).
5This methodology is attributable to Mirrlees (1971, 1986). Recent literature in this ﬁeld includes Diamond (1998),
2and Spadaro (2002) “consider the eﬀective marginal tax rates schedule that corresponds to an actual
redistribution system and...look for the social welfare function according to which that schedule would
be optimal” (p. 2). The analysis advocated by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2002) thus enables a
practitioner to determine whether the social welfare function implied by the observed marginal tax
rate schedule is consistent with ap r i o r iexpectations. Similarly, the framework of analysis presented
in this paper enables the relativities implicit in transfer policy to be compared against the consistency
and monotonicity properties that could be expected of a ‘sensible’ equivalence scale.6 Whereas the
approach suggested by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2002) interprets observed marginal tax rates in
terms of social welfare, the approach presented here interprets the relativities implicit in a transfer
system in terms of the equivalence scale methodology.7
Very few studies have attempted to estimate the equivalence scales implicit in tax policy, and
those that do have focused on a subset of the transfer system.8 This apparent lack of interest can be
attributed to the perception that “income taxes are not typically coherent with equivalence scales”
(Lambert, 1993, p. 364). In the absence of a generally agreed optimal solution9, it is unsurprising
that diﬀerent countries have adopted transfer systems that take a range of diﬀerent forms. The
system that is perhaps the most transparently consistent with the equivalence scale methodology is
the quotient familial applied in France, as described by Atkinson et al. (1988). Others, such as
the system of exemptions and credits applied in the UK, bear less resemblance to the equivalence
scale framework.10 T h ep e r c e p t i o nt h a tm a n yt a xa n db e n e ﬁts systems are inconsistent with the
equivalence scale methodology is strengthened by the observation that the individual tax and beneﬁt
schemes from which transfer systems are comprised often imply diﬀerent relativities. How should an
analyst decide which scheme, and consequently which relativities, to use? Furthermore, given that
many beneﬁts provide safety-net incomes, how can an analyst be sure that the implied equivalence
scales are relevant for the entire distribution of income, rather than just the bottom tail?
An equivalence scale that embodies only part of a tax and beneﬁts system is evidently of limited
Saez (1998), Salanié (1998), d’Autume (1999), and Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000), cited by Bourguignon and Spadaro
(2002).
6If the scales implied by transfer policy are found to be inconsistent with ap r i o r iexpectations (are found, for example,
to be decreasing in household size), then this may reveal that existing transfer policy is inconsistent with the concept of
horizontal equity - which is itself an interesting ﬁnding.
7The applied analysis presented by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2002) considers two extremes with regard to the
relationship assumed between heterogeneous households. In the ﬁrst instance household diﬀerences are ignored. In the
second, households are considered exclusively within homogenous demographic subgroupings, from which qualitative
comparisons are made.
8See, for example, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1978), which calculates equiva-
lence scales based on the short-term scale rates of supplementary beneﬁts.
9See, for example, the impossibility result of Moyes and Shorrocks (1998).
10See Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997)
3interest.11 Section 2 introduces a formal framework that is consistent with the equivalence scale
methodology, and demonstrates how the framework relates to the concept of horizontal equity. It is
frequently assumed that the adjustments made by ﬁscal policy for household heterogeneity describe a
range of equivalence scales, rather than a single set of relativities.12 In Section 3 it is shown that the
suggested framework, based on a single equivalence scale, is suﬃciently ﬂexible to reﬂect any transfer
system. The generality of the model is a product of relaxing all ap r i o r irestrictions, including
the assumption of base independence, upon the equivalence scale. In Section 4, a non-parametric
procedure for estimating equivalence scales implicit in tax and beneﬁts systems is introduced. In
Section 5 estimates are reported for the relativities implicit in the Australian transfer system.13 The
equivalence scale estimates derived from tax and beneﬁts data are also compared with a range of
alternative scales, including those used by government agencies in Australia, the scale proposed by
the OECD, and scales estimated from household expenditure data. It is found that the scales implicit
in the Australian transfer system compare well with the oﬃcial and demand based scales, and the
relationship with income is both interesting and intuitive. Conclusions from the study are summarised
in Section 6.
2 Equivalence Scales and Taxation
Assume that the redistributive objectives of tax policy designers (the government) are framed in terms
of income per equivalent adult. Values in adult equivalent terms, as measured by the government, are
denoted by a * superscript. Let a∗
i denote the number of equivalent adults in tax unit i.E a c ha∗
i can
be regarded as a function of a set of m observable variables (which may include income) of the tax
unit vi =( v1i,...,v mi),s ot h a t : 14
a∗
i = a∗ (vi) (1)





i are respectively pre-tax and post-tax equivalent income.
Given the distribution of x∗
i for a population, the government is considered to impose a tax structure
that is capable (subject to a budget constraint) of achieving its distributional aims. This involves a
11See Ebert and Lambert (1999).
12See, for example, Coulter et al. (1992).
13The Australian transfer system is considered here in response to the prior expertise of the authors. Estimating the
equivalence scales implicit in the UK transfer system is planned to be the subject of a subsequent study.
14Seneca and Taussig (1971) recognised the importance of allowing the scales implicit in transfer policy to be income
dependent. See, also, the empirical results presented by Banks and Brewer (2002).
15Throughout this paper, pre-tax and post-tax income refer, respectively, to income gross and net of associated tax
and beneﬁtp a y m e n t s .
4tax function, T∗ (x∗
i), so that the net adult equivalent income of unit i is:
y∗
i = x∗
i − T∗ (x∗
i) (2)
In equation (2), the tax function depends only upon pre-tax equivalent income, which ensures that the
requirement of horizontal equity is satisﬁed.16 This assumption can be relaxed by adding an individual
speciﬁc term, ε0
i,t ot h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 2 ) .
Assuming that the same equivalence scale is applied to both pre-tax and post-tax income, equation
(2) translates to:








This speciﬁcation was alluded to by Vickrey (1947, pp. 295-296) who wrote; “A more thoroughgoing
and equitable procedure [than exemptions and credits] would be to set up some factor indicative of
the needs of the entire family, divide the total income by this factor, compute a per capita tax on this
‘per capita income’, and multiply the tax so computed by the family size factor to obtain the total
tax for the family”.17
2.1 Family size, horizontal equity, and taxation
Horizontal equity is the command that equals be treated equally by a transfer system. Although there
is widespread support for this concept, there is an ongoing debate regarding who should be deﬁned
as equals and what constitutes ‘equal tax treatment’.18 Consequently, it is important to provide a
clear deﬁnition of what horizontal equity means here, and how it may be used to motivate the formal
framework considered by this paper.
Horizontal equity is deﬁned here as the requirement that: “If two individuals would be equally well
oﬀ (have the same utility) in the absence of taxation, they should also be equally well oﬀ if there is
at a x ” (Feldstein, 1976, p. 83, emphasis in the original). Consider, for example, a population that
is comprised of one and two adult households (singles and couples), where households are further
diﬀerentiated by their respective ability levels (wage rates). Household size is the only non-income
characteristic that is relevant for tax purposes, and is deﬁned exogenously - hence behavioural eﬀects
are not considered in this dimension.19 Deﬁne s subscripts for single adult households and c subscripts
16The “principle of equity, or horizontal equity, is fundamental to the ability-to-pay approach, which requires equal
taxation of people with equal ability and unequal taxation of people with unequal ability” (Musgrave, 1959, p. 160).
This requirement is discussed further in the following subsection.
17Quoted by Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997, p. 346). See also Pyatt (1990), and Ebert (1997).
18See Lambert (2003) and Ebert and Lambert (2002) for alternative interpretations of horizontal equity and their
relation to equivalence scales.
19See, for example, Nerlove et al. (1984), and Barro and Becker (1989) for models of endogenous fertility.
5for couples. Pre-tax and post-tax income are deﬁned by x and y respectively (as in the previous
subsection), and it is assumed that pre-tax income is equal to earnings derived through labour, l,v i a
the (unobserved) wage rate, w, x = wl.T h ev a r i a b l e ,l,i sd e ﬁned as the proportion of a household’s
total time spent on labour, which takes a value between zero and one for both singles and couples.
The government is considered to impose a tax schedule, Tk (x),w h i c hm a yd i ﬀer between couples and
singles (hence the subscript k), such that household pre-tax and post-tax income are related by:
y = wl − Tk (wl) (4)
The household utility function, u(y,l), is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave, (strictly) increasing in
y, (strictly) decreasing in l, and continuously diﬀerentiable. Furthermore, it is assumed that u →− ∞
as l → 1 from below. An assumption of equal sharing is made, such that every member of a household
enjoys the same level of utility, indicated by the function u(.).20 An equivalence scale, ac = a(uc),








Equation (5) reﬂects the fact that a couple are likely to convert post-tax income into utility diﬀerently
to single adults because of the need to share. Labour, in contrast, is not similarly aﬀected. No attempt
is made to estimate the utility functions that are considered here - rather the functions u(.) can be
interpreted as the utility that the government attributes to households when formulating transfer
policy.22
Households are assumed to select their labour supply (given perfectly competitive markets, no
proﬁts, and a clearing labour market) to maximise their utility, subject to the budget constraint
deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 4 ) . 23 For single adult households the solution is obtained by maximising the
Lagrangian:
L = us (y,l)+λ(wl − Ts (wl) − y) (6)
20This assumption is made in view of the scarcity of data regarding intra-household distributions. See, for example,
Kaplow (1996) for an explicit consideration of alternatives to the assumption of equal sharing.
21Equation (3) implies that ac can be stated as a function of (observable) income, whereas it is fundamentally a
function of (unobservable) utility. For the government to be able to impose a horizontally equitable tax, it must be able
to infer a household’s ability by observing its type and income. Hence, it is necessary for there to exist a one-to-one




w for all conceivable abilities
(wage rates).
22Rosen (1978) considers a similar framework to the one deﬁned here, but takes a diﬀerent view by estimating utility
functions from household income and labour data to consider the issue of horizontal equity.
23The model considered here assumes that individuals are free to choose how much labour they supply. Involuntary
unemployment could be included in the model, by recognising it as an individual characteristic (in much the same way
as health or invalidity might be included as a characteristic in the equivalence scale speciﬁcation).
6Deﬁning equivalent post-tax income for couples by y∗ = y/ac, and the equivalent wage rate by w∗ =
w/ac, the decision for couples can be identiﬁed by maximising:








The ﬁrst order conditions of equations (6) and (7) indicate that there is a critical wage rate for singles
(ws0), and for couples (w∗
c0), such that a wage rate in excess of the critical rate is suﬃcient to induce
some labour supply, l>0. To simplify the analysis, the wage rate of any household is assumed to be
suﬃcient to reach an interior solution throughout the remainder of this section.
Substituting Ts (wl)=Tc (wl)=0into equations (6) and (7) reveals that, when single adult and
two adult households enjoy the same equivalised ability (w∗ in equation (7) = w in equation (6)),
they are subject to the same maximising problem in the absence of taxation and hence, given the
assumptions made, will enjoy the same utility. We therefore deﬁne households as pre-tax equals if
they possess the same equivalised ability.24 The speciﬁcation of pre-tax equals as households with
the same equivalised ability (and the same pre-tax equivalent income25) can be contrasted with the
framework of Balcer and Sadka (1986), and Banks and Brewer (2002), who deﬁne pre-tax equals as
households with the same pre-tax unequivalised incomes, and to Seneca and Taussig (1971) who deﬁne
p r e - t a xe q u a l sa sh o u s e h o l d sw i t ht h es a m epost-tax unequivalised incomes.
A horizontally equitable tax in the current context must consequently imply that the same level
of post-tax utility will be enjoyed by households with the same equivalised ability. Comparison of
equation (6) with (7) reveals that single adult and couple households with the same equivalised ability







which restates equation (3).26
Given the strong support that horizontal equity has received from a diverse range of views regarding
redistributive justice27, it seems reasonable to suppose that it does play an important role in the
design of transfer policy. This is the premise upon which the remainder of the current paper is based.
24This ﬁnding implies that, if the equivalence scale ac embodies economies of scale, then couples will require a lower
(average) ability than single adults to enjoy the same utility. Consider, for example, the case when ac =1 .6,a n d
each member of a couple supplies the same number of labour hours and earns the same hourly wage rate. Given these
conditions, if each member of a couple are to enjoy the same utility as a single with ability ws,t h e nwc = acws =1 .6ws.
Since wc is shared equally between the members of the couple, each must consequently earn 80 per cent of the single’s
wage.
25Pre-tax equals will share the same pre-tax equivalent income if there exists a unique solution to the utility maximising
problem, which (given the assumptions made regarding us (.)) is ensured if Ts (x)=Tc (x)=0 .
26No attempt is made to generalise this discussion, which remains an issue for subsequent research.
27See, for example, Musgrave (1990) for a brief review.
7Speciﬁcally, we assume that the government makes value judgements regarding the relative needs
of diﬀerent households, and that transfer policy is designed with reference to a population whose
preferences are consistent with the value judgements made. It is important to note, however, that the
value judgements (implicitly) made by a government may (and arguably will) bear little resemblance
to the preferences of the actual population. Furthermore, policy objectives that run orthogonal to
horizontal equity are likely to complicate the relativities implicit in tax and beneﬁts systems.28 Hence,
although equivalence scales that reﬂect the value judgements made by government are an important
descriptive tool, they have limited appeal as a means of analysing social welfare. Interpretation of the
welfare implications of equivalence scales implicit in transfer policy will necessarily depend upon how
such scales relate to a priori expectations regarding, for example, monotonicity and uniformity.
3 Generality of the equivalence scale framework
Consider a transfer system that is comprised of numerous tax and beneﬁt schemes, where each scheme
depends upon household characteristics (such as the number and age of household members, their
health status, pre-tax income, and so on), v, and may embody a diﬀerent set of relativities to those
of other schemes. It is clear that there will exist a tax function, T (x,v), which relates pre-tax and
beneﬁt and post-tax and beneﬁt income, such that:
yi = xi − T (xi,v i) (9)
for each household i.29 The generality of equation (9) is suﬃcient to capture a broad range of redistrib-
utive systems; from the quotient familial applied in France, to the system of exemptions and credits
applied in the UK. How might the system described by equation (9) be related to the equivalence scale
framework, using a single set of relativities denoted by a∗? While the equivalence scale framework is,
in principle, quite general, a few restrictions, plausible in themselves, can result in signiﬁcant restric-
tions on the tax functions. We ﬁr s ti l l u s t r a t et h i sp r o p o s i t i o n ,a nd then consider some implications
for the properties of the equivalence scale function a∗ of assumptions about the tax function T (x,v)
, such as being progressive and diminishing in household size, given x.
To illustrate restrictions on the tax functions, suppose that the equivalent tax function T∗ (x∗)
28For example, unemployment beneﬁts may be designed to encourage labour market participation, or family beneﬁts
speciﬁed to aﬀect fertility rates (compare the diﬀerent fertility objectives of state policy in France and China).
29As in the case of equation (2), equation (9) omits any horizontal inequity, consistent with the oﬃcial speciﬁcations
commonly implied by tax and beneﬁt policy. Horizontal inequity can be included by adding an error term to the right
hand side of equation (9).
8takes the quadratic form:
T∗ (x∗)=β0 + β1x∗ + β2x∗2 (10)
If a∗ is a (potentially base dependent) equivalence scale, then from equation (3) we require:
a∗T∗ (x∗)=T (x,v)
∴ β0a∗2 + β1xa∗ + β2x2 = a∗T (x,v)
∴ a∗ =
T (x,v) − β1x ±
q




Supposing that T (0,v) < 0 for all v (consistent with the view that the tax system provides a net
beneﬁt to households with zero pre-tax income), then the negative square root of equation (11) must






Hence, if the government provides a transfer beneﬁt for all tax units with zero pre-tax income, such
that T (0,v) < 0 for all v,t h e nβ0 must be less than zero to obtain a∗ (0,v) greater than zero for all
v.I fβ0 < 0, then we require:
T (x,v) − β1x −
q
(β1x − T (x,v))
2 − 4β0β2x2 < 0 (13)
to observe a∗ (x,v) > 0 for any x and v.T h e r e f o r e :
T (x,v) − β1x<
q
(T (x,v) − β1x)
2 − 4β0β2x2 (14)
It is clear that
T (x,v) − β1x ≤ |T (x,v) − β1x|
and that
|T (x,v) − β1x| <
q
(T (x,v) − β1x)
2 − 4β0β2x2
for any x>0 when β0 < 0 and β2 > 0. Hence, assuming that T (0,v) < 0 for all v,w er e q u i r eβ0 < 0
and β2 > 0 for a∗ (x,v) to be positive for any tax unit - the equivalent tax function must be strictly
progressive in the sense that the average tax rate must be an increasing function of pre-tax income.
This restriction on the tax function is the outcome of the three assumptions: a quadratic tax function,
T (0,v) < 0 for all v,and a∗ (x,v) to be positive for any tax unit.
The restriction, T (0,v) < 0, considered above is consistent with most practical cases, since transfer
systems generally provide a net beneﬁt to households with no pre-tax income. There are, however,
9exceptions to this rule, particularly for households with large wealth stocks. If T (0,v i) < 0 for some vi
and T (0,v j) ≮ 0 for some vj, then equation (12) indicates that there are no equivalent tax parameters
which will ensure that a∗ (0,v) > 0 for all conceivable speciﬁcations of the tax unit. In the case of
wealthy households, however, the equivalence scales obtained by the above framework do retain a
sensible interpretation. When, for example, the transfer system provides no net beneﬁt to a tax unit,
vj, with zero pre-tax income, T (0,v j)=0 , then it is clear from equation (12) that a∗ (0,v j)=0for
any β0 6=0 . This is consistent with the interpretation that the tax unit vj has no tax relevant needs
when it has no pre-tax income, a value judgement that is possibly justiﬁed for households with large
stocks of wealth. Furthermore, it is arguably preferable to consider an income concept that includes
all pecuniary accruals of wealth measured over a long period of time for households with large wealth
stocks, in which case it is less likely that T (0,v j) ≮ 0 will be observed for some vj.
3.1 Properties of the implicit equivalence scale
It is useful to consider how the properties of the equivalence scale a∗ deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 3 )r e l a t et o
properties of an observed tax and beneﬁts system. Assume that the observed tax burden of household i
depends upon pre-tax income, xi, and household characteristics including the number, age, and health
status of household members, vi, such that post-tax income is given by:
yi = xi − T (xi,v i) (15)
For equations (3) and (15) to be equivalent over the relevant domain of x and v, we need:
a∗T∗ (x∗) ≡ T (x,v) (16)
and:
T∗ (x) ≡ T (x,v0) (17)






≡ T (x,v) (18)
Equation (18) deﬁnes an implicit function for a∗ in terms of pre-tax income, household characteristics
and reference characteristics:
a∗ = a∗ (x,v,v0) (19)
To analyse the properties of the function a∗, consider the following assumptions about T (.). Assume
that the tax function T (.) is diﬀerentiable in pre-tax income x and in size s, a component of v.30
30Diﬀerentiability with respect to size s, which is an integer, is easily relaxed by considering unit changes 4s =1in
what follows.
10Furthermore, we assume for the moment that T (.) is progressive in x (∂ logT/∂logx>1) given v31,









where ts = ∂ logT (x,v)/∂s and t∗
x = ∂ logT (x/a∗,v 0)/∂ log(x/a∗). The assumption of progressivity
implies that t∗
x > 1. If, as we have assumed, ts < 0 where s is a household size characteristic, then a∗
will be increasing in s, as we should expect. If, in contrast, T (.) is locally regressive, then the opposite
conclusion may apply to speciﬁc pre-tax income domains.
The relationship between the equivalence scale a∗ and pre-tax income x is now investigated. Dif-









where tx = ∂ logT (x,v)/∂ logx.S i n c e1−t∗
x < 0, a∗ will be diminishing in x if tx >t ∗
x and increasing
in x if tx <t ∗
x.32 Some (progressive tax) examples illustrate the issues. First, consider the case of a
linear tax and beneﬁts system with credits:
T (x,v)=αx − c(v) (22)







= αx − c(v) (23)
and hence:
a∗ = c(v)/c(v0) (24)
which implies that the equivalence scale function is base independent. Thus, if actual tax and ben-
eﬁts systems are close to this linear case, at least over some income ranges, we can expect a∗ to be
approximately independent of x over those ranges.33
Now consider a progressive tax and beneﬁts system (in the sense that the marginal tax rate is
increasing in pre-tax income) with exemptions:
T (x,v)=αx + βx2 − c(v) (25)
31Empirically, this is often untrue. See, for example, Brewer and Clark (2002) who show that marginal eﬀective tax
rates are frequently higher at lower incomes in the UK.
32Local regressivity implies that the opposite observations may apply over limited pre-tax income domains.
33See also, Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997, p. 347).
11where β>0.F o ra∗ > 1, it is possible to show that tx >t ∗
x in this case, so that a∗ is decreasing in x.
An iso-elastic progressive system with exemptions has the same property. Here:
T (x,v)=αx1+β − c(v) (26)
where β>0. Hence the relationship between a∗ and x is dependent upon the speciﬁcation of the tax
function. Furthermore, the examples considered here suggest that, where the tax function describes a
progressive system with (income independent) exemptions, the equivalence scale will be decreasing in
pre-tax income.
4 Estimating the Equivalence Scales Implicit in Transfer Systems
Given that the equivalence scales discussed in this paper are implicit, and hence unobservable, non-
parametric estimation methods that impose limited a priori restrictions on the speciﬁcation of the
equivalence scale are particularly useful. The remainder of this paper is consequently concerned
with non-parametric estimates. Two alternative procedures that use standard econometric regression
techniques to estimate assumed tax and equivalence scale functions are described in Appendix A.34
4.1 Non-Parametric Estimation
A number of alternative non-parametric procedures can be devised for estimating the equivalence
scales implicit in tax and beneﬁts policy. The approach that is described here is one that we found
useful when deriving the estimates that are reported in the following section. The approach involves
three principal stages:
1. Population Division. The sample population used to estimate the equivalence scales is divided
into subgroups, within which tax units are considered to be homogenous in all tax relevant
respects other than pre-tax and post-tax income.
2. Tax Function Estimation. Standard non-parametric methods are used to estimate the tax func-
tions of each individual subgroup identiﬁed in (1) above.
3. Equivalence Scale Inference. The tax functions estimated in (2) are used to obtain functions of
the average tax rate versus pre-tax income, AV ti (x), for each of the subgroups, i,i d e n t i ﬁed in
(1). Let the subscript i =0denote the reference unit used to deﬁne the equivalence scale. The
34Regression techniques are complicated by the highly non-linear nature of the model described by equation (3). See










Figure 1: Relating the Average Tax Rates of Alternative Population Subgroups




, where AV ti (xi)=AV t0 (x0) (27)
This last stage of the estimation procedure warrants some comment. If it is assumed that the same









Equation (28) indicates that the equivalence scale does not aﬀect the ratio of pre-tax to post-tax
income, or equivalently the average tax rate, AV t(x)=T (x)/x =( x − y)/x. The equivalence scale
discussed here consequently applies a proportional adjustment to pre-tax and to post-tax income, so
that the tax function of any household is mapped onto the tax function of the reference household by
way of the average tax rate. This is described graphically in Figure 1.
Figure 1 displays tax functions for two household types, T0 (singles) and T1 (couples). Consider
an equivalence scale that speciﬁes the tax adjustment made for couples relative to the associated
adjustment that is made for singles. When a couple earn pre-tax income x1, their average tax rate is
given by t1/x1,a n dt h eﬁgure indicates that the equivalence scale is equal to a(x1)=x1/x0 = t1/t0,
t1/x1 = t0/x0.
13It is evident from the above discussion that, if the tax function of the reference unit is not strictly
progressive in the sense that the average tax rate is strictly increasing with pre-tax income (or, more
accurately, that the average tax rate does not vary strictly monotonically with pre-tax income), then
the equivalence scale implicit in tax policy may not be unique.35 This observation serves to highlight
the care that must be exercised when selecting a reference unit, and when calculating the equivalence
scales that are implicit in tax and beneﬁts policy. Furthermore, the above discussion does not address
the issue of calculating associated standard errors, which remains an issue for further research.36
5 Equivalence Scale Estimates for Australia
This section presents equivalence scale estimates calculated using simulated and survey data for Aus-
tralia. The section begins with a description of the data used, before discussing the non-parametric
equivalence scale estimates, and then the parametric estimates obtained. The section concludes by
comparing the tax implicit equivalence scales with scales that have received some oﬃcial recognition,
and with scales estimated from household expenditure data.
5.1 Data
Simulated Data
A simulation model is used to generate a synthetic population of households that are diﬀerentiated
by their number of adults, number of children, and their pre-tax and post-tax incomes. The synthetic
population is comprised of single adults with up to two dependant children and couples with up to
three dependant children (7 diﬀerent demographic combinations), for 51 measures of pre-tax annual
income ranging between $0 and $100,000. Given the number of adults, the number of children and
the pre-tax income of a household, the simulation model generates measures of post-tax income based
upon the rates and thresholds of the following 10 tax and beneﬁt schemes, as they were deﬁned in
1997/98:37
• Newstart (NS): An unemployment beneﬁt payable to individuals who are available for, capable
of, and actively seeking work between the ages of 18 and 65.
35This point is ﬁrst alluded to by the analysis that is reported in Section 3. Indeed, it is possible to devise examples
where the equivalence scale will not be deﬁned at all.
36Given that the non-parametric estimates discussed here are sample statistics, it is presumably possible to use resam-
pling methods to obtain bootstrap estimates for associated standard errors.
37Post-tax income is generated assuming that; all couples are married; all household income is earned by one individual;
no household is eligible for an ‘over 60s bonus’ for the basic NS rate; there are no part year recipients; there are no wealth
tests; if there are children in a household, then at least one child is under 5 years of age (for the Medicare Levy).
14• Family Payment (FP):Ab e n e ﬁt that is structured to support low income families with depen-
dant children.
• Parenting Payment (PP):Ab e n e ﬁtp a i di n s t e a do fNewstart to one member of a married couple
with at least one dependant child. It has a more generous income test than Newstart and does
not require the recipient to be seeking employment.
• Sole Parent Payment (SPP): The sole parent equivalent of the Parenting Payment.
• Income Tax: Income taxation is levied on individual rather than joint incomes, and takes a
standard multi-step form with 5 progressive marginal rates.
• Medicare Levy (ML): Charged in addition to Income Tax, to fund the costs of a universal health
care system.
• Family Tax Initiative (FTI): A scheme designed to support households with dependant children
(in addition to the FP). It is comprised of two parts; Family Tax Assistance for households that
earn a suﬃciently high taxable income, and Family Tax Payment for low income families.
• Dependent Spouse Rebate (DSR): A tax rebate that can be claimed by individuals who have a
spouse who earns a suﬃciently low income.
• Sole Parent Rebate (SPR): A tax rebate that can be claimed by single parents with dependant
children.
• Low Income Earner Rebate (LIR): A tax rebate that can be claimed by individuals who earn a
suﬃciently low income.
The procedures that are used to simulate these transfer schemes are based upon a study by Creedy
and van de Ven (1999). In 1997/98, the transfer schemes listed above accounted for 73.0 per cent of all
social security expenditure excluding beneﬁts for the elderly, and 82.0 per cent of individual taxation
liability.
Survey Data
The survey data are derived from the Conﬁdentialised Unit Record File (CURF) of the 1997-1998 Sur-
vey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) for Australia. This survey provides income and demographic
data for individuals who are aggregated into households.38 The SIHC records annual household in-
come measured in 1997 Australian dollars, and attempts to account for all direct pecuniary ﬂows.
38Refer to the Australian Bureau of Statistics for detailed information regarding the SIHC.
15Importantly, for the analysis that is undertaken here, no attempt is made to impute indirect taxes or
transfer beneﬁts. The results presented here must consequently be interpreted bearing this limitation
in mind.
5.2 Non-Parametric Estimates
Figures 2 to 4 display non-parametric estimates of the equivalence scales implicit in the Australian tax
and beneﬁts system. Also included in Figures 2 to 4 are equivalence scale estimates based on household
expenditure data, the scales recommended by the OECD, and Henderson equivalence scales.39 The
alternatives to the tax implicit equivalence scales considered, are the scales that are most commonly
applied in the existing literature, and consequently allow a comparison with the status quo. The
comparative analysis undertaken here is preliminary and incomplete insofar as it omits reference to
associated standard errors. A more thorough interpretative analysis remains an issue for further
research.
Four data series are displayed in each of the panels of Figures 2 to 4, three of which are derived from
simulated data, and one from survey data. The series denoted ‘smoothed - bandwidth = 0.2’ describes
the non-parametric estimates of equivalence scales derived from simulated data, using tax functions
estimated by the ‘lowess’ procedure in STATA (with a bandwidth equal to 0.2). Similarly, ‘smoothed
- bandwidth = 0.8’ refers to non-parametric estimates obtained from simulated data using lowess with
a bandwidth of 0.8.40 Equivalence scale estimates obtained without smoothing the simulated tax
functions are denoted as ‘no smoothing’ in each of the ﬁgures. Finally, ‘survey data (bandwidth =
0.8)’ refer to non-parametric estimates obtained from survey data using a bandwidth of 0.8.41 The
alternatives to the tax implicit equivalence scales all take base independent speciﬁcations, and are
consequently displayed as points on the vertical axis to avoid excessive clutter.
The tax implicit equivalence scale estimates obtained from simulated data are easier to analyse
than those derived from survey data because of the limited sources of household heterogeneity involved.
These are consequently discussed, before making comparisons with the estimates obtained from survey
data, and the alternative equivalence scales displayed in each graph. In all cases, the equivalence scale
estimates are speciﬁed with reference to single adults without dependant children (for whom the
39See Appendix B for a detailed description of the demand based, OECD and Henderson scales referred to here.
40In STATA, lowess calls a non-parametric regression procedure that obtains a separate estimate, ˆ yi, for each obser-
v a t i o ni nad a t as e t ,(xi,y i),b yr e g r e s s i n gy on x for a limited proportion of the data set (deﬁned by the bandwidth).
The regression weights the data such that points further from the central point (xi,y i) receive less weight. See Cleveland
(1993) for further details.
41A bandwidth of 0.8 was selected for the survey based estimates displayed here, after testing a number of alternatives.
The authors may be contacted for associated results.







0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
smoothed - bandwidth = 0.8 smoothed - bandwidth = 0.2
no smoothing survey data (bandwidth = 0.8)
















0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
smoothed - bandwidth = 0.8 smoothed - bandwidth = 0.2
no smoothing survey data (bandwidth = 0.8)







1 Adult & 2 Children








0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
smoothed - bandwidth = 0.8
smoothed - bandwidth = 0.2
no smoothing
survey data (bandwidth = 0.8)







2 Adults & 0 Children
equivalence scale takes a value of one). Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003) note that tax implicit
equivalence scales may be sensitive to the reference unit adopted. Single adults are adopted for the
analysis presented in this paper because of their prevalence in the survey data used, and the relatively
wide range of their average tax rates. A relatively high prevalence in the survey data improves the
accuracy of the estimate obtained for the tax function of reference households, and a wide range of
average tax rates is useful because of the comparisons that are made to infer tax implicit scales as
discussed in Section 4.
Figure 2 indicates that the Australian tax and beneﬁt schemes included in the simulation analysis
tend to treat single parents more generously than they do single adults without dependant children,
where the equivalence scales for single parents are greater than one for all measures of pre-tax income
considered. Focussing upon the estimates obtained from simulated data that were not smoothed
(no smoothing), the scales for single parents with one and two children are highly base dependant,
increasing at approximately the same rate from $0 to peak at $24,000, before falling away at higher
pre-tax incomes. Furthermore, the scale estimates obtained for single parents with one child are
strictly less than the estimates for single parents with two children when pre-tax income is less than
$74,000, where the two are equal for higher incomes.
The trends observed for the equivalence scales relate to elements of the simulated tax and beneﬁt
schemes. SPP provides a higher beneﬁt rate and less punitive means testing than NS.T h i sd r i v e s
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2 Adults & 3 Children
19a wedge between the post-tax incomes of single people with and without dependant children, which
increases in size until pre-tax income reaches $14,000, before falling away at higher incomes. The
eﬀects of FP, FTI,a n dSPR also increase the post-tax incomes of single parents relative to otherwise
similar single adults without children. It is not until the means testing of FP takes eﬀe c tt h a tt h e
equivalence scales of single adults tend to fall with higher pre-tax income. The fact that SPR is
not means tested implies that the wedge between single parents and otherwise similar single adults
without children will not go to zero as pre-tax income is increased, and hence the equivalence scales
of single parents remain greater than one for higher incomes.
The scale estimates derived from unsmoothed simulated data displayed for single adults in Figure
2 suggest that the government takes greater consideration of the needs of single parents (relative to
single adults without dependant children) as incomes rise up to a threshold, but that this considera-
tion decreases thereafter. This is consistent with the view that single parents face a greater burden
associated with working than those without children due, for example, to the ﬁnancial costs associated
with childcare and the emotional strain of parental responsibility. The fact that the equivalence scales
for single parents fall away after a threshold income level is consistent with the view that, at higher
incomes, parenthood becomes a consumption decision that should be borne by the individual rather
than by society.
The amount of smoothing increases with the bandwidth used for the lowess estimation procedure
-t h i si sr e ﬂected by the three series derived from simulated data displayed in Figure 2 (for reference,
the ‘no smoothing’ condition is equivalent to assuming a bandwidth of 0). It is interesting to note that
the equivalence scale estimates obtained from survey data, which were derived using a bandwidth of
0.8, bear a closer relationship to the estimates obtained from simulated data using a bandwidth of 0.2
than to those obtained using a bandwidth of 0.8. This result is observed because the distribution of
the survey population is concentrated between $15,000 and $30,000 (AUD), as opposed to the uniform
distribution that is generated by the simulation model. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly,
the survey data include more noise than the simulated data do.
With regard to the alternatives to the tax implicit equivalence scales displayed in Figure 2, it can
be seen that the demand system, Henderson, and OECD scales take values that are less than the
Engel scales and greater than the Rothbarth scales. The values of the demand system, Henderson,
and OECD scales are consequently consistent with biasses that have been associated with the Engel
and Rothbarth methods, which tend respectively to overstate and understate the actual child costs
borne by households.42 The tax implicit equivalence scale estimates of single parents with no pre-tax
42On biasses associated with the Engel and Rothbarth scales see, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1986, p. 732)
20income and one dependant child are higher than the Engel scales, and rise (except for the scales with
a band-width of 0.8) to a maximum at approximately $20,000 per annum, or 65 per cent of mean
pre-tax income (MPTI, $31,450), before falling to approach the Rothbarth scales at incomes in excess
of 200 per cent of MPTI.
To assign some normative interpretation to these observations, consider the implications of as-
suming that the demand system estimates provide an accurate reﬂection of the relative costs borne
by single parents, and that the non-parametric estimates obtained from unsmoothed simulated data
provide an accurate reﬂection of the relativities implicit in transfer policy. The top panel of Figure 2
consequently suggests that the Australian transfer system makes a greater proportional adjustment for
household need than the proportional increase in the costs incurred due to the addition of a dependant
child for single parents on very low pre-tax incomes, and that this disparity increases up to 60 per
cent of MPTI. This variation is consistent with the view that the children of single parents should be
adequately provided for, either because they are not responsible for the decisions of their parents or
because there are social beneﬁts to be enjoyed from such provision. In contrast policy makers may
take the view that the onus of adequate provision for single adults without dependant children should
rest with the individual (and hence under-provide for their associated costs). Above 60 per cent of
MPTI the excess proportional adjustment for household need made by the transfer system falls, and
drops below the proportional increase in costs incurred due to the addition of a dependant child when
income exceeds 150 per cent of MPTI.
A similar proﬁle is observed for the equivalence scales of single parents with two children, displayed
in the lower panel of Figure 2. The tax implicit equivalence scales for single parents with two children
are, however, lower relative to the associated demand based and oﬃcial scales than for single parents
with one child. This suggests that Australian policy makers may take into consideration the incentive
eﬀects associated with making larger provisions for the needs of single parents relative to the costs
that parents actually incur due to their dependant children.
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the Australian tax and beneﬁts system is more generous to couples
than to single adults without dependant children, and tends to make a larger adjustment for household
need as the number of children increases. Focussing upon the series associated with the unsmoothed
simulated data, the equivalence scale estimates obtained for couples without children take a value of
approximately 1.7 until pre-tax income reaches $20,000, after which the estimates fall away sharply
to restabilise at approximately 1.2. These observations are principally driven by two schemes; at low
pre-tax incomes, the NS beneﬁt is more generous and imposes a less severe means test for couples
and van de Ven (2003).
21than for singles; and at high incomes the DSR (which is not means tested) drives a wedge between
the post-tax incomes of couples and singles. Comparison of Figure 3 with 4 indicates that the base
dependence of the equivalence scales derived for couples with children is more smooth than for couples
without dependant children. This is attributable to the gradual way that means testing is applied for
NS, PA, FP,a n dFTI.
The equivalence scale estimates displayed in Figures 2 to 4 suggest that, in general, the government
implicitly assumes some economies of scale when adjusting for household need. This is indicated by the
fact that smaller vertical shifts are observed as household size increases. Furthermore, the equivalence
scales for couples without dependant children are consistent with the value judgement that adults
should be supported up to a pre-tax income threshold (of approximately $22,000), after which they
are largely responsible for taking care of their own needs. The 20 per cent adjustment made for adults
with high incomes and a dependant spouse relative to otherwise similar single individuals is likely
to be less than the costs that are actually incurred by the addition of a spouse (a proposition that
is supported by the demand based equivalence scale estimates discussed below). This is consistent
with the view that having one member of a childless couple take on a ‘home-maker’ role becomes a
consumption decision at higher household incomes. It also suggests that the adjustment for household
need takes into consideration the value of home production for couples.
Turning attention to the alternative equivalence scales displayed in Figures 3 and 4 for two adult
Australian households, it can be seen that both the Engel and Rothbarth scales for couples without
dependant children exceed the OECD, demand system, and Henderson scales. van de Ven (2003) sug-
gests that this observation is attributable to biasses that are associated with the Engel and Rothbarth
methods, which cause both methods to over-estimate the costs to households of adult members. Given
that biasses associated with the Rothbarth method tend to underestimate the costs to households of
children, the observation that the OECD, demand system and Henderson scales tend to increase
relative to the Rothbarth scales as the number of children in a household increases is expected.
In general, the tax implicit equivalence scale estimates for two adult households exhibit a negative
relationship with income. In all three panels displayed in Figures 3 and 4, the non-parametrically
estimated equivalence scales for tax and beneﬁts policy cross through the demand system estimates
at approximately average pre-tax income. Hence, if the demand system equivalence scale estimates
accurately reﬂect the costs of heterogeneous households relative to a single adult without dependents,
and if the tax implicit estimates obtained by the non-parametric procedure embody the relativities
implicit in the Australian transfer system, then couples appear to be treated preferentially at low
22incomes, and relatively harshly at higher incomes. The equivalence scales at low incomes consequently
suggest that the government may perceive a larger social beneﬁt to be gained by supporting couples
than singles (potentially for social reasons). In contrast, the equivalence scale estimates observed at
high incomes are consistent with the view that couples enjoy beneﬁts beyond economies of consumption
due, for example, to their ability to share household responsibilities.
Comparing the estimates obtained from survey data with those derived using simulated data indi-
cates the extent to which the relativities described by the survey data are captured by the simulation
model. The estimates displayed in Figure 3, for example, indicate that couples are treated more gen-
erously on average relative to single adults in the survey data than by the simulation model. This can
be attributed to some form of income splitting that is undertaken by couples when calculating their
tax burden, which is not taken into consideration by the simulation model.43 Nevertheless, despite
t h es i m p l i c i t yo ft h es i m u l a t e dt a xa n db e n e ﬁts system, most of the estimates derived from simulated
data displayed in the ﬁve panels of Figures 2 to 4 bear a close relationship to the associated estimates
derived from survey data, suggesting that the simulation model does a (surprisingly) good job at
mimicking the relativities implicit in the actual Australian tax and beneﬁts system.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Redistributive policy that makes explicit reference to non-income characteristics of households - such
as their size and demographic composition - embodies an implicit set of relativities. Tax and beneﬁts
policy consequently provides an important, and as yet under-utilised source of information for identi-
fying the value judgements (implicitly) made by policy makers regarding the needs of heterogeneous
households. In this paper it is suggested that the equivalence scale framework can be used to make
the relativities embedded in transfer policy explicit.
A formal model for considering observed tax and beneﬁts systems within the equivalence scale
framework is introduced, and its relationship with the concept of horizontal equity is described. Fur-
thermore, it is shown that the ability of the model to reﬂect transfer systems that are commonly
observed depends crucially upon the assumptions made regarding the equivalence scale speciﬁcation.
Our equivalence scale speciﬁcation is general enough to capture transfer systems observed in practice.
A number of methods can be used to estimate the equivalence scale implicit in tax and beneﬁts
policy. We consider a non-parametric approach here that infers the relativities implicit in transfer
43The simulation model assumes that all household income is earned by a single individual, which is not the case for
survey data.
23policy using data that are described by common household surveys, such as the Survey of Income and
Housing Costs in Australia. The fact that the estimation procedure considered here is based upon
survey data, rather than relying upon microsimulation models, is of particular importance because
simulation models can provide only a limited reﬂection of transfer systems; the eﬀects of imperfect
take-up rates, tax avoidance and various tax minimisation strategies imply that the real world impact
of a transfer system may be quite diﬀerent from the impact that is implied by oﬃcial rates and
thresholds.
The estimation method is used to explore the relativities implicit in the Australian transfer system,
based upon simulated data for a subset of the system, and survey data from the SIHC. The estimates
derived using tax and beneﬁts data are compared with a range of alternative scales, including estimates
obtained from expenditure data, scales applied by government statistical agencies in the two countries,
and the scales suggested by the OECD. The implicit equivalence scale estimates obtained suggest that
the adjustments made by the Australian transfer system for diﬀerences in household need describe an
interesting and intuitive set of value judgements.
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27A Regression Estimation Methods
The regression methods that are discussed here are of interest because they enable functional forms to
be estimated directly from survey data, and because they allow for an explicit treatment of associated
error terms. In practice, however, practical application of the regression methods can prove diﬃcult
because of the highly non-linear nature of the regression models. A study that is principally concerned
with practical application of these models is currently a work in progress - see Muellbauer and van de
Ven (2003) for some preliminary analysis.
A.1 Joint Econometric Estimation
The term ‘joint estimation’ is used to refer to the following procedure because it involves estimating
the equivalence scale and equivalent tax functions jointly.44 Restating equation (3):

















and substituting into equation (29) obtains:











which can be estimated using standard non-linear regression techniques. It is evident from the speci-
ﬁcation of equation (30), however, that the error term will be heteroscedastic. Consider, for example,
the case in which the function T (.) takes the form of an Nth order polynomial. Then:














+( ai + λi)εi (31)
44This is distinct from the common use of the term ‘joint estimation’ in the econometric literature, where it refers to a
procedure that takes into consideration hypothesised correlations between the error terms of two regression models. In
the analysis undertaken here, the correlation between the error terms of the equivalent tax function and the equivalence
scale is unidentiﬁable, and is consequently assumed to be zero. See below for further discussion.
28where the βj terms are tax function coeﬃcients, ai = a(vi),a n dεi = ε0















































where the approximations assume small λi. Substituting for the tax function terms in equation (31),
we obtain the following:





















where ψi accounts for the approximations made to obtain equation (32). The error term of this
equation is deﬁned by:
 i = aiεi + λiεi +
N X
k=0





λi + ψi (34)
We assume that the error terms, εi, λi,a n dψi have an expectation of zero, and a constant variance for
all i. Furthermore, we assume that the error terms are all independent of the exogenous variables of the
model (that the model is correctly speciﬁed), and that the error terms are independent of one another.
This last assumption warrants some discussion. Speciﬁcally, it is clear from equation (30) that the
tax function and the equivalence scale are related, which implies that the associated error terms, ε
and λ, might also be correlated. Equation (34), however, indicates that it is not possible to derive
explicit estimates for the individual error terms; following regression of equation (33) we have only
one equation - (34) - and three unknowns - ε, λ,a n dψ. Hence the assumption made here regarding
the independence of ε and λ cannot be tested using the model. It is possible, for example, to assume
that no error is associated with the equivalence scale (λ =0 ) , in which case (assuming ψi =0for all i)
all of the error associated with an estimate of equation (33) will be attributed to the tax function (ε).
29The assumption of zero correlation between ε and λ implies that there is some separability between
the process by which the transfer system identiﬁes a household’s ‘type’ (and hence its needs), and the
process by which it determines the household’s net transfer payment given it’s allocated type. In our
view, this assumption appears reasonable.
Given the following assumptions:







cov (εi,λ i)=cov (εi,ψi)=cov (λi,ψi)=0
cov (εi,z i)=cov (λi,z i)=cov (ψi,z i)=0
where zi deﬁnes all exogenous variables of equation (33), E (.) deﬁnes the expectation, var(.) the
variance, and cov (.) the covariance (which is also assumed to apply to all higher moments), the
properties of  i are deﬁned by:


















cov ( i,z i)=0 (37)
Since the form of the heteroscedasticity is known, but the associated parameter estimates are not, this
analysis suggests that it is appropriate to estimate equation (33) by either Weighted Least Squares or
Generalised Methods of Moments.
A.2 Two-stage or mixed estimation
In practice, using the joint estimation procedure described above to estimate the equivalence scale
and equivalent tax functions is complicated by a number of factors. Most important of these is the
income dependence of the equivalence scale, which can take a highly non-linear form. This, and the
fact that such a relationship is unlikely to be known ex ante, implies that the function adopted for the
equivalence scale may not be suﬃciently ﬂexible to accurately reﬂect the relativities implicit in the
transfer system, which will result in omitted variable bias.
When an equivalence scale is desired for distributional, rather than interpretive purposes, some
forms of omitted variable bias may actually help to improve the estimates obtained. Omitting relevant
30health related characteristics may, for example, lead to an upward bias of coeﬃcients on old age
identiﬁers, which could help to correct the estimated equivalence scale for distributional analysis.
However, omitting pertinent variables from the equivalence scale speciﬁcation, and income related
variables in particular, is likely to bias the coeﬃcients of the tax function as well as those of the
equivalence scale when derived from a joint estimation. Estimating the equivalence scale and equivalent
tax functions jointly means that the biasses of one function can produce biases in the other function,
which complicates interpretation of the parameter estimates obtained. Speciﬁcally, interpretation of
the equivalence scale as a proportional adjustment to income which ensures that the same tax function,
primarily applicable for reference households, is applicable for the entire population, does not hold
when biassed estimates are obtained for the equivalent tax function of reference households.
One useful test for determining the adequacy of the equivalence scale and tax functions used is
to check whether the tax function coeﬃcient estimates derived from a non-linear regression of the
entire population are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the tax function coeﬃcient estimates obtained for the
reference population when taken in isolation. In practice, it may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd a speciﬁcation
for which the tax function parameter estimates are stable when calculated using the restricted and
unrestricted populations. When this is the case an alternative method of estimation is required.
The test described above suggests one possibility; a two-stage estimation procedure in which the tax
function and equivalence scale are estimated separately.45
Two-stage estimation is available in two alternative forms. The iterative method set out in Section
4.1 can be used to generate values of a∗
i f o ro b s e r v e dh o u s e h o l d sw i t ha ni n c o m exi and characteristics
vi. A parametric function for a∗
i(x,v,v0) can then be estimated. Note that this method is consistent
with parametric or non-parametric estimates of net tax functions.
The alternative two-stage method takes the parametric form (30) and estimates the β’s for the
reference household type. Given these estimated values, now substitute the equivalence scale function
(19) into (30) and estimate the parameters of (19) through weighted non-linear least squares.
Two-stage estimation prevents the biasses of the equivalence scale feeding into the tax function
(and vice versa). As such, where the tax function used provides a close approximation to the observed
tax function of reference households, the biasses that remain with regard to the equivalence scale
will be largely conﬁned to the type that tend to improve the estimates for distributional purposes, as
discussed above.
45Again, the use of the term ‘two-stage estimation’ that is adopted here should not be confused with its common
use in the econometric literature. In the current context, it refers to separate estimation of the equivalent tax func-
tion and equivalence scale in two distinct stages, as opposed to a procedure that is designed explicitly to adjust for
heteroscedasticity of the associated error terms.
31The indeterminacy that is associated with the error structure of equation (34), will continue to
apply to the second stage of the two-stage regression procedure. Speciﬁcally, we might assume that
reference households are only those for which the tax function estimate derived in the ﬁrst stage of the
procedure provides an accurate description of the relationship between pre-tax and post-tax income,
in which case εi =0for all i, and hence all of the error observed for the second stage of the estimation










Alternatively, it is possible to assume that both the tax function and the equivalence scale are subject
to error, in which case the error structure of the second stage of the procedure will be described
by equation (34). These observations regarding the error structure highlight the importance of the
precise deﬁnition that is adopted for the reference household when estimating an equivalence scale
that is implicit in transfer policy.
B Alternative Equivalence Scales
B.0.1 Demand based equivalence scales
Equivalence scale estimates based on household expenditure data are considered by van de Ven (2003),
using the base independent speciﬁcation deﬁned by:








where ci deﬁnes the number of children (under the age of 18) in a household, and ni denotes the total
number of household members. Three demand basede s t i m a t i o nm e t h o d sa r ec o n s i d e r e db yv a nd e
Ven (2003); the Engel method, the Rothbarth method, and a method based on a demand system. All
of the scales considered by van de Ven (2003) are assumed to be base independent (as indicated by
the speciﬁcation of equation (39)), which is consistent with the demand based literature. Equivalence
scale estimates derived using each of the three approaches are displayed in Table 1, which are used to
calculate the associated equivalence scales displayed in Figures 3 to 4.
B.0.2 OECD scales
The OECD scale is recommended by the OECD for use when there exists no other preferred scale, or
where international comparisons are to be made. The scale considered here assigns a value of one to
46Assuming ψi =0for all i.
32Table 1: Demand Based Equivalence Scale Estimates
parameter Engel Rothbarth Dem. Sys.
φ -0.60810 -0.93955 -0.32349
(0.0563) (0.0566) (0.0253)
γ 1.02571 0.91798 0.67985
(0.0275) (0.0291) (0.0130)
Coefficient standard errors provided in parentheses
the reference person of a household, 0.7 to their partner, and 0.5 to any dependant children regardless
of household income. Hence a household that is comprised of a couple with two dependant children is
allocated a scale of 2.7.47
B.0.3 Henderson scales
The Henderson equivalence scale is commonly used for analysis of Australian income data - see, for
example, the Australian Bureau of Statistics publication, Income Distribution, Australia 1997-1998.48
This scale allocates points depending upon household member characteristics, and the number of
people in a household. The relevant points, which are independent of household income, are deﬁned
in Table 2.
Table 2: Henderson Scale
Points
Each Individual
First Adult 20.0    
Spouse 9.5    
Dependent Child 7.5    
Household Size (persons)
1 17.0    
2 19.8    
3 22.5    
4 25.0    
5 27.5    
6 30.0    
7 32.0    
47See The OECD List of Social Indicators, OECD, 1982.
48ABS Catalog Number 6523.0. See, also, Henderson, et. al (1970), and Appendix F of the Australian Government
Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975).
33